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Abstract:  
The article analyses how the programmatic structure of welfare schemes in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany shape public perceptions of and preferences for migrants’ entitlement to 
social benefits and services. Firstly, the article finds that despite high complexity and the presence 
of some severe misperceptions, the entitlement criteria of migrants within existing social benefits 
and services do shape public perceptions of reality. Secondly, the article finds that these 
institutional shaped perceptions of reality strongly influence preferences for how migrants’ 
entitlement criteria should be. This status quo effect is more moderate among populist right-wing 
voters, in general, and in the critical case of attitudes to non-EU-migrants’ entitlement to social 
assistance in Denmark. However, in all segments, one finds strong correlations between “are” and 
“should be”, which is taken as indications of clear and sizeable institutional effects.   
 
 
  
Introduction  
The social rights of migrants have become a salient political issue in Northern Western European 
countries. The context is the increased level of migration, in general, and the right to free movement 
of labour within the EU, in particular. The underlying unresolved question is whether generous 
welfare states can coexist with high levels of migration (Freeman, 1986). One of the early 
predictions, largely derived from the American case, was that the public would redraw support for 
welfare schemes in a more ethnically diverse society (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). A number of 
studies have tried to verify or falsify this prediction by connecting stocks or flows of migrants to 
welfare state support in Europe. The results have been rather inconclusive (Schaeffer, 2013). The 
overall pattern is (still) that Europeans display widespread support for their welfare states 
(Svallfors, 2012). 
 The overall stability in support for the welfare state might hide a tendency to what has 
been labeled welfare chauvinism. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) denominated the term in 
their study of how the Norwegian and Danish populist right-wing parties in the 1980s, the so-called 
Progress Parties, wanted to restrict welfare rights to “natives” and exclude migrants. The article 
uses the term welfare nationalism as it is believed to be more neutral (welfare restrictiveness is an 
alternative). More formally, one can define welfare nationalism as the exclusion of non-citizens 
(living permanently within the state boundaries) from collective social benefits and services and 
welfare nationalist attitudes as a preference for such policies. Working on party manifesto data, 
Eger & Valdez (2014) show that welfare nationalism has become a pivotal element among 
contemporary populist-right-parties throughout Europe. National parliaments are free to exclude 
non-EU-migrants from welfare benefits and services, while some of the social rights of EU-
migrants are protected by EU-treaties and their interpretation by the EU-court. Thus, rather than 
general retrenchment, one could expect a dynamic towards a generous welfare state for the citizens, 
a less generous for EU-migrants and a residual for non-EU-migrants (Emmenegger, 2012). Whether 
welfare nationalist attitudes have increased over time is difficult to tell, as historical survey data are 
unavailable. Recent studies indicate stability from 2008 to 2016 in European countries except for an 
increase in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (Eger, M. A. et al., forthcoming; Heizmann et 
al., 2018). 
The article contributes to the literature on welfare nationalist attitudes by studying the 
effect of the programmatic structure of existing welfare schemes. The two first sections present 
theory, previous research, and a revised institutional argument. The third introduces data and the 
applied method. The fourth describes how institutions shape perceptions of migrants’ entitlement 
criteria. The fifth describes how these perceptions shape preferences. The sixth formally model the 
relationship between “are” and “should be”. The last section concludes and discusses the 
implications.  
 
Theory and previous research   
One of the fundamental divides in opinion research is whether attitudes are seen as exogenous or 
endogenous to institutions. The article starts from the assumption that both perceptions of reality 
and preferences are endogenously given. The existing welfare schemes and their entitlement rules 
are examples of political institutions, which historical institutionalists broadly define “as the formal 
and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996:938). Following the 
formulation of sociological institutionalism by March and Olsen such institutions install a logic of 
appropriateness. Thus, institutions do not only shape incentive structures, as argued by rational 
choice institutionalism, but also limits the choices that can be imagined and found acceptable 
(1989). The combination of historical and sociological institutionalism has strongly influenced the 
study of general public attitudes to the welfare states. In Svallfors’ formulation, “institutions also 
[besides incentive structures] affect perceptions and norms in a more direct way: (a) they affect the 
visibility of social phenomena; (b) they affect what is considered politically possible to achieve in a 
given setting, and (c) they embody, and hence create, norms about what is fair and just” (Svallfors, 
2007:10, with reference to Rothstein 1998 , Svallfors 2003, Mau 2003, Mettler and Soss 2004).  
The institutional perspective has been puzzling absent in studies of welfare 
nationalism. Most of the previous studies perceive welfare nationalist attitudes as exogenously 
given. The self-interest of various groups is largely derived from their labour market positions, 
absence of solidarity with migrants is largely derived from prejudices or larger narratives about 
national belonging, and sociotropic concern is largely derived from perceptions of macro-economic 
burden, level of crime, mass media content or populist right-wing rhetoric. These factors are all 
exogenous to the welfare schemes actually in place. It is indeed a stable finding that lower 
socioeconomic groups (whether defined as low-educated, low-income households or those with 
precariat work conditions) are more welfare nationalistic (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2013; Mewes and 
Mau, 2012; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). It is a stable finding that 
“natives” are seen as more deserving to social benefits than are migrants; even in vignette studies 
were work ethic and other characteristics of recipients are kept constant (Ford, 2016; Kootstra, 
2016; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018). It is also a stable finding that those who perceive 
migrants as an economic and cultural burden for the nation-state are more welfare nationalistic than 
are those that perceive migrants as an economic and cultural gain to the country (Gerhards and 
Lengfeld, 2013; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 
2012).  Finally, it is a stable finding that voters of the populist right-wing parties hold more welfare 
nationalistic attitudes than other groups (Eger, Maureen A. and Valdez, 2018). Hence, these 
previous studies are successful in explaining why some segments indicate high levels of welfare 
nationalism. However, they provide little guidance as to why citizens in the first place would give 
migrants entitlement to benefits and services.  
The limited number of studies that perceive (absence of) welfare nationalism as 
endogenous to the institutional structure of the welfare state have been more inconclusive. They 
often start from the somewhat puzzling finding, at least for rational choice institutionalism, that 
welfare nationalist attitudes seem less and not more prevalent in more generous welfare states. This 
e.g. led Crepaz and Damron to conclude that “comprehensive welfare systems reduce welfare 
chauvinism and experience fewer conflicts in the area of politics of identity than in liberal regimes” 
(2009:457). Their theoretical backbone is Titmuss’s classic argument about universal entitlement 
criteria dismantling the distinction between “them” (the receivers) and “us” (the contributors) 
(Larsen, 2008; Rothstein, 1998; Titmuss, 1974). The counter-argument is that welfare states 
originate from a nation-building project with a hard distinction between citizen/non-citizen; 
including those with the largest number of universal schemes (Miller, 1993). Furthermore, the idea 
of giving migrants entitlement to tax-financed benefits and services based on a residence can easily 
be seen as a “magnet” for migrants with low human capital, who do not even need to contribute 
before they are entitled, in contrast to an insurance system (Ruhs and Palme, 2018). It is telling that 
welfare nationalism as a populist right-wing discourse originates from Denmark and Norway.   
The classic empirical approach to study institutional effects have relied on Esping-
Andersen’s distinction between three different regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Esping-Andersen,  
1990). Using the item made available by the European Social Survey in 2008 (ESS, see below), 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway had the largest share willing to give migrants access “immediate” or 
without work-requirement (respectively 36, 30 and 26 percent); only surpassed by Israel with a very 
special immigration history (44 percent). This gives the Crepaz and Damron’s institutional 
argument some support. However, the pattern is not clear-cut. The general pattern in the ESS-data is 
that all European publics, the Scandinavians included, opt for conditional entitlement criteria 
(Mewes and Mau, 2012; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). Furthermore, van Der Waal, De Koster 
and Van Oorschot (2013) found no effect when they more directly studied whether the level 
selectivity of the welfare state influenced welfare nationalism. Therefore, previous research leaves 
us with no clear answer to whether and how institutions influence welfare nationalist attitudes.  
 
A revised institutional argument  
The focus on the effects of universalism and its application in the Nordic countries has left a more 
trivial, but potential much more important, institutional effect unexplored. One of the most basic 
arguments from historical sociological institutionalism is that existing institutions shape perceptions 
about what is normal. It is this institutional embodiment of normality, which according to Svallfors 
creates norms about what is fair and just. Applied to the case of welfare nationalism, one should 
expect that the entitlement criteria of migrants in existing welfare schemes establish perceptions of 
normality, which again are used as guidelines for what is fair and just. That perceptions of what 
“are” are used as a guideline for what “should be” is backed by a comprehensive literature in the 
field between sociology and social psychology. In George Homan often cited formulation “the rule 
of distribute justice is a statement of what ought to be, and what people say ought to be is 
determined in the long run with some lag by what they find in fact to be the case” (1974: 249-250). 
The same prediction is made by the just world theory. It suggests that individuals have a need to 
believe that they live in a just world, which led participants in Lerner’s classic experiments to infer 
from how rewards (randomly) were distributed to how they ought to be distributed (Furnham, 2003; 
Lerner, 1980). A somewhat different theoretical argument is found in Kahner, Knetsch and Thaler 
but the implications are very similar “any stable state of affairs tends to become accepted 
eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer readily come to mind” (1986:730-
31). These experimental results have in particular been verified by the International Social Survey 
Program’s module that measured perceptions of and preferences for wage differences (e.g. Gordon 
Marshall et al., 1999; Kjærsgård, 2012). Rooted in this literature, the article seeks to advance the 
institutional line of reasoning by describing how the public perceives the entitlement criteria of 
migrants and how these perceptions of reality shape preferences. The article sets out to test the 
following two interlinked theses: 
  
I) Existing entitlement criteria of migrants shape public perceptions about reality. 
 
II) The public perceptions about how the entitlement criteria for migrants “are” shape 
preferences for how they “should be”.  
 
Data and method 
The comparative studies of welfare nationalism are dominated by studies using the following item 
from ESS: “Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think 
they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?” 
(Mewes and Mau, 2012; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Van Der Waal 
et al., 2013). One limitation of this item is that we do not know what kind of services and benefits 
respondents have in mind. Therefore institutional effects can only be studied at aggregated regime 
level, which has left us we unclear results (see previous section). The national studies of welfare 
nationalism have primarily focused on social assistance  (Bay et al., 2013; Careja et al., 2016; De 
Koster et al., 2013; Marx and Naumann, 2018; however, see Hjorth, 2015 for child-benefits; and 
Kootstra, 2016 for housing and disability benefits). This has also made it difficult to see 
institutional effects as close to all social assistance schemes are organized as a targeted means-
tested benefit of last resort.  The strategy of this article is to study welfare nationalism across five 
different areas, health care, public pension, unemployment benefit, social assistance and childcare, 
across three countries and across EU- and non-EU-migrants.  
The article uses MIFARE-data collected in Denmark, the Netherlands and West 
Germany in 2015. The added value is the possibility to directly test the link between “are” and 
“should be” (see below). The country and area selection is limited by the data. However, the 
countries represent a social democratic welfare regime (Denmark), a conservative welfare regime 
(Germany), and a mix between these two (the Netherlands). The theoretical expectation is that the 
two theses hold true in all three contexts. However, Denmark is believed to be a critical case as 
welfare nationalist ideas have been promoted by highly successful populist rights-wing partiers 
since the late 1980s, as already mentioned. The main message has been that existing entitlement 
rules for migrants need to be changed. In the Netherlands and Germany, welfare nationalist ideas 
are more recent, which e.g. is reflected in less mass media coverage of the issue than in Denmark  
(Blauberger et al., 2018). Furthermore, social assistance is believed to be a critical case, as the rules 
are complex (which makes Thesis I less likely), and as populist-right wing parties especially have 
questioned migrants’ access to this benefit (which makes Thesis II less likely). How the political 
actors through both direct and indirect policies reduce non-EU-migrants’ access to social assistance 
is well described in the previous literature (Andersen, 2007; Bay et al., 2013; Breidahl, 2017; Careja 
et al., 2016; Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2014). This has especially been the case in Denmark, 
where the welfare nationalist policy materialized in the form of reduced social assistance benefit 
levels for non-EU-migrants (Andersen, 2007, Breidahl 2017). This so-called “Start help” was 
introduced in 2002, abolished in 2012, and reintroduced in 2015. Thus, migrants’ access to social 
assistance in Denmark is believed to a critical case for testing Thesis II.    
  In each country, 900 citizens (adult, not foreign born) were sampled in 2015 
respectively in national registers by Statistics Denmark, Statistics Netherlands and in regional 
registers by the German survey team (cluster sampling stratified on the size of cities). Data was 
collected between December 2015 and April 2016 by postal surveys with a CAWI option included. 
The response rate was 47 percent in the Netherlands, 44 percent in Denmark and 27 percent in 
Germany. Despite modest dropout-bias judged by background variables, the scale of dropout in 
Germany could indicate problems. Thus, in the German case, the data are best suited to analyze 
correlations within the net-sample (see Bekhuis et al., 2018 for data collection details).   
The perceptions of the entitlement criteria of migrants were measured by asking; “The 
following questions are about your KNOWLEDGE of the rights of migrants from [countries within 
the European Union] / [outside the European Union] living in [Denmark] / [the Netherlands] / 
[Germany]. If you do not know the answer, please just provide us with your best guess. At which 
point after arrival do migrants from [countries within the European Union] / [outside the European 
Union]  have the same rights as natives of [Denmark] / [the Netherlands] / [Germany] to …. “.  
1) “...use the public health care system?”  
 
2)” ... receive public pension from Denmark/the Netherlands/Germany?”  
 
3) “... receive unemployment benefits from Denmark/the Netherlands/Germany?”  
 
4) “... receive social assistance benefits?” 
 
The response-categories were adopted from the ESS-item with small modifications. The wording 
was:    
 
1) “After registering as resident in Denmark / the Netherlands / Germany”.  
 
2) “After residing in Denmark / the Netherlands / Germany for an extended period of time, whether 
or not they have worked”. 
 
 3)“Only after they have worked and paid taxes and insurances for an extended period of time”. 
 
4) “Once they have become Danish/Dutch/German citizens (obtained nationality)”.  
 
5) “They never get the same rights”.  
 
The preferences for entitlement criteria were measured by asking: “The following questions are 
about what social rights you think migrants from [countries within the European Union] / [outside 
the European Union] living in [Denmark] / [the Netherlands] / [Germany] SHOULD have in 
Denmark/ the Netherlands / Germany. At which point, after arrival, should migrants from 
[countries within the European Union] / [outside the European Union]  have the same rights as 
natives of [Denmark] / [the Netherlands] / [Germany] to …. “. Followed by the same response 
categories (don’t know added).   
The first analytical step is to establish the relationship between actual and perceived 
entitlement. This is difficult to do with accuracy, as the actual entitlement rules of migrations are 
complicated. However, the aim of the article is not to explain who understand and who do not 
understand the current entitlement rules. The aim is to establish that existing institutions actually 
shape perceptions of reality. The second analytical step is to establish the relationship between 
perceptions and preferences. This is formally modeled by means of multinomial logistic 
regressions. They estimate the odds-ratio of pointing to an entitlement criterion different from the 
base, which for both the dependent (preference) and independent (perception) variables are “only 
after they have worked and paid taxes and insurances for an extended period of time”(3). Those 
giving no answer on the dependent variable were treated as missing.i As control variables, we 
included country dummies (the Netherlands used as base), sex, age, age squared, education in seven 
levels (ISCED-coded, with non-responses coded as no formal education) and seven dummies for 
household income after tax per month (don’t know /no answer as a separate dummy). In order to 
establish a conservative test, the models also include two attitudinal dimensions proved to be 
important in previous studies. The first is a measure of the feeling of shared identity with migrants. 
The wording was “We are also interested in your sense of belonging to different groups living in 
[Denmark]/[the Netherlands]/[Germany]. How strong, would you say, is your sense of belonging to 
the following groups… […the people who migrated from countries of the European Union]/[… 
migrants in general].ii The two variations are used in models of attitudes to respectively the 
entitlement of EU- and non-EU-migrants. The second attitudinal dimension is the perception of 
migrants’ net contribution/gain from the welfare state. The wording was “Some people think that 
immigrants in [Denmark]/[the Netherlands]/[Germany] contribute more in taxes than they benefit 
from social benefits and services. Other people think they benefit more from the social benefits and 
services than they contribute in taxes. When you think about the following groups, what comes 
closest to your point of view?”. 1) Migrants from countries of the Western European Union, 2) 
migrants from countries of the Eastern European Union, 3) migrants from poor countries outside 
Europe and 4) migrants from rich countries outside Europe”. Item 1) and 2) are used in models of 
EU-migrants, while 3) and 4) are used in models of non-EU-migrants.iii 
 
Reality and perceptions of reality  
Migrants’ entitlement to social benefits and services is a complicated matter that has developed into 
an independent research topic (e.g. Pennings and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2018). As for EU-migrants, the 
EU-treaties guarantee free movement of EU-workers and their access to social benefits and services 
on the same conditions as citizens, i.e. for questions about EU-migrants the “right” answer is the 
same criteria as for citizens. There is a number of exceptions in the EU-legislation and in practice, 
the social rights of EU-citizens are established in a complex interaction between the EU-court, the 
EU-commission and the member states (Blauberger et al., 2018). As for non-EU-migrants, national 
parliaments are free to control the entitlement criteria. However, with some notable exceptions (see 
below), non-EU-migrants with a residence permit in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany have 
the same entitlement criteria as citizens, at least formally. Figure 1 shows how the public think the 
entitlement criteria of migrants “are”.  
 
  
Figure 1: Perceptions of current rules (“are”). Across areas, countries and migrant category. 
Percent. Nmin Denmark 394, Netherlands 424, Germany (West) 241. “Right” answer ticked. 
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For healthcare, the most common perception is that both EU- and non-EU-migrants 
have equal access after registering as residents. This is in line with reality. A simple residence 
criterion is used in Denmark. Germany and the Netherlands use compulsory insurance. However,  
as all residents are insured, the system is in practice open to both EU- and non-EU-migrants “after 
registering as a resident”. Around 70 percent gives this answer in all three countries. Those 
answering “only after worked and paid tax/insurances for an extended period of time” are not 
necessarily wrong. Especially, the German and Dutch system has better coverage for better-insured 
workers and their families than what is provided as a minimum. Even the universal Danish system 
has a (minor) occupational/private supplement. The minorities answering “never” or “citizenship” 
clearly got the entitlement criteria wrong. However, the overall pattern is that reality is reflected in 
perceptions.  
 For pensions, perceptions also reflect reality. In Germany and the Netherlands, the 
most common answer is that migrants get the same rights as citizens after they have worked and 
paid taxes/ insurances; given by around 60 percent. This is overall in line with the reality of the 
Dutch and German compulsory pension insurance system. However, again the rules are complex as 
the Dutch pension system also has a residence-based minimum allowance. A migrant living legally 
50 years in the Netherlands without tax/contribution payment would receive the same basic flat-rate 
pension as a Dutch citizen with the same work history. In Germany, old-aged migrants without any 
insurance payment can only claim a means-tested social pension. The Danish Peoples pension cause 
larger problems as respectively 40 and 50 percent (EU/non-EU-migrants) have the misperception 
that it based on citizenship. The right answer is residence plus time. Full People’s pension is given 
after residing for 40 years in Denmark. Again the system is complex as Denmark also has a (minor) 
insurance system combined with a large number of occupational pensions.  
For unemployment benefits, a majority in all three countries rightly indicate that 
entitlement of both EU- and non-EU migrants is conditioned on tax/insurance payment. This answer 
is given by between 54 (EU-migrants Denmark) to 77 percent (EU-migrants Germany). Thus, the 
largest misperceptions are found in Denmark, where 19 and 13 percent indicate respectively 
“citizenship” and “residency” for EU-migrants. All three countries have an insurance-based 
unemployment benefits system. 
For social assistance, the confusion is larger. This is understandable as the systems are 
less straightforward. For EU-migrants, social assistance is conditioned on having worked in the 
host-country, in general. For non-EU-migrants, the simple residence criterion applies in the 
Netherlands and Germany (Pennings, 2012). In Denmark, non-EU-migrants face a seven years 
time-criterion before they obtain the same rights as citizens (Andersen, 2007). The work 
requirement for EU-migrants is not strongly reflected in public perceptions. It is the most typical 
answer in the Netherlands and the second most typical in Germany. However, in Denmark, this 
answer was only given by 17 percent, while 42 percent incorrectly point to a residence criterion. At 
the same time, a sizeable share in all three countries has the misperception that a work requirement 
applies to non-EU-migrants, which is not the case. It is also a widespread misperception in 
Denmark and in the Netherlands that social assistance entitlement is depended on citizenship. Thus, 
one could argue the Thesis I does not hold true. However, the system is complex as municipalities 
might choose to give social assistance based on residence. In Germany, the right to exclude non-
working EU-migrants from social assistance has even resulted in a long court dispute. Thus, the 
rules are not clear.   
Finally, it is the dominant perception in Denmark and Germany that both EU- and 
non-EU-migrants have the same rights to public childcare as citizens, which is in line with reality. 
In the Netherlands, childcare is dominated by non-public facilities, which does require a 
contribution. However, the specific allowance given to parents in order to pay for these services is 
based on residence (kinderopvangtoeslag). This somewhat confusing public/private mix is probably 
what causes around 40 percent of the Dutch to indicate that both EU- and non-EU migrants access 
is dependent on having worked and paid taxes and insurances for an extended period of time.  
 Based on these survey results one cannot conclude that the existing programmatic 
structure of welfare schemes have left the Danish, Dutch and German publics with clear perceptions 
of when and how EU- and non-EU migrants have the same social rights as citizens. The confusion 
and misperceptions are particularly severe when it comes to social assistance, the Danish Peoples’ 
pension and Dutch childcare. However, at an overall level, the public was able to pinpoint the 
universal entitlement criterion within healthcare and the insurance criterion within unemployment 
benefits and Dutch and German pensions. Thus, one can partly confirm Thesis I. The next question 
is whether perceptions of entitlement criteria go together with preferences.  
 
Perceptions of reality and preferences 
Table 1 shows the share of respondents who picked the exact same “should be” and “are” 
entitlement criterion, i.e. a perfect match at the individual level. If the “should-be” preferences and 
“are perceptions” were randomly distributed, one should expect four percent with a perfect match. 
The finding is very different.  Above 60 percent in Germany and the Netherlands think that the 
entitlements rules “should be” exactly as they think they “are” for both EU- and non-EU-migrants. 
The preferences of Danes are in all five areas less structured by “are perceptions”, which is in line 
with the argument of Denmark being a critical case. However, there is still a majority a perfect 
match in four areas; the exception is social assistance. Thus, the overall pattern is a sizeable overlap 
between “should-be” and “are perceptions” at the individual level, which supports Thesis II. The 
aggregated “should be” preferences are shown in Appendix Figure A1. 
 
Table 1: Share choosing the same criterion for “should be” and “are”. Across areas, countries and 
migrant category. Percentage. Nmin Denmark 394, Netherlands 424, Germany 241 
 Healthcare Pension Unemployment 
benefits 
Social 
assistance 
Childcare 
 EU Non-
EU 
EU Non -
EU 
EU Non -
EU 
EU Non -
EU 
EU Non-
EU 
DK 68 67 56 59 63 62 42 45 61 62 
NL 78 76 70 71 72 73 62 64 69 71 
DE 84 79 77 81 79 78 60 63 72 73 
 
 
As for Danes preferences for migrants’ access to social assistance, the share in favor of (perceived) 
status quo is 42 and 45 percent respectively for EU- and non-EU-migrants. This is caused by nine 
and 11 percent respectively opting for softer entitlement criteria (EU/non-EU-migrants) and 49 and 
42 percent opting for harsher entitlement criteria. Thus, preferences for more restrictive criteria are 
as widespread as the status quo preferences. Whether “are” perceptions still significantly shape 
attitude formation in this critical case is formally tested below.  
 
The controlled “are” and “should be” correlations  
The next question is whether the relationships between “should be” and “are” are statistically 
significant and stable after control for other variables, which previous studies have shown to be of 
importance. Table A0 in online appendix summarizes the relationships between “are” and “should 
be” by means of odd-ratios controlled for potential effect from country characteristics, 
socioeconomic differences, feeling of shared identity with EU-migrants/migrants in general and 
perceived economic gain/loss for the Danish, Dutch and German welfare state (effects from control 
variables shown in online appendix Table A1 to A10). The overall finding is that in all ten multi-
nominal logistic regression models there is a strong and significant status quo effect. Thus, Thesis II 
is confirmed. The relationship between “are” and “should be” is stronger than any other 
relationship found. As for the control variables, low shared identity increases the likelihood of 
answering “never” (significant in eight models) and perceptions of migrants being a net gain 
increase the likelihood of answering “immediately access” (significant in eight models).  In line 
with previous research, one also finds a direct negative effect of low education on the likelihood of 
answering “never”. With these variables in the models, plus “are-perceptions”, there is no direct 
gender- or age-effect. The country-effects are also modest (with the exceptions of Germans being 
more willing to give immediate access to childcare (compared to Dutch) and Danes more likely to 
answer “citizenship” within pension and “never” for non-EU-migrants access to social assistance 
(compared to Dutch). Thus, the country-differences seen in Table 1 are largely explained by the 
variables included in the models.  
 The case of non-EU-migrants’ access to healthcare can be used as an example of the 
estimates of the status quo effect. A person who thinks that similar rights as natives are granted to 
non-EU-migrants immediately after registering as resident has higher odds of answering that this is 
also how it should be (probability that she picks this answer over the probability that she does not 
pick this answer) compared to the odds of a person who thinks similar rights are dependent on 
tax/insurance payment (reference category). The ratio between the two odds are 54.9; controlled for 
differences caused by sex, age, education, income, feeling of shared identity and assessment of 
economic gain/loss of migration. If a person thinks that healthcare rights of non-EU-migrants are 
conditioned on time lived in the country, this increases the odds of answering that this is how it 
“should be”. The odds-ratio is 30.0. If a person thinks that equal rights are depended on citizenship, 
this again increases the odds of answering that this is how it “should be”. The odds-ratio is 32.7. 
Finally, if a person thinks that non-EU-migrants never get the same healthcare rights as natives, this 
increases the odds of answering that this is also how it should be “should be”. The odds-ratio is 
48.3.   
The odds ratios provide a condensed measure of the relationship between “are” and 
“should be” but they can be hard to give a substantive interpretation. Therefore, as an example, 
Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of “should be” answers for persons with different “are” 
perceptions controlled for background factors. For those believing that a residence criterion applies 
to non-EU-migrants (the lower horizontal line in Figure 2), the predicted probability of answering 
this is how it “should be” is 80 percent (the black dot). Their probability of given one of the other 
four answers is ten percent or below (the other markers in the lower horizontal line). For those with 
other “are” perceptions (the other horizontal lines in Figure 2), it also holds true that they are more 
inclined to opt for that particular “should be“ answer. It is clear for the case of believing that non-
EU-migrant never have access, only have access after citizenship and only after tax/contribution 
payment. It is less clear-cut for those believing that EU-migrants get the same rights after just 
residing in the country a year. They have a 34 percent probability of giving the same “should-be” 
answer (the highest) but also have 31 percent probability of preferring immediate access. However, 
still the status quo effect dominates. 
    
  
Figure 2: Predicted probability for “should-be” answers for non-EU-migrants access to health care 
by “are” perceptions. Controlled for country-effects, socio-economic differences, feeling of shared 
identity and perception of economic gain/loss on EU-/non-EU-migrants. 
 
 
The sizeable main effects of perceived entitlement rules are stable across different segments of 
respondents. Additional analyses show that the effects are not (consistently) stronger among those 
who think that migrants contribute more than they take out of the welfare states (which could be 
expected from a rational choice perceptive) or among the sizeable group that answer that they do 
not know if migrants take more out than they put into the welfare state (which could be expected 
from mental short-cut perspective). The effects are nor found to be stronger among the less 
educated (again to be expected from a mental-short-cut perspective) or consistently weaker among 
low-income groups (which could be expected from a rational choice perspective). The effects were 
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neither (consistently) conditioned on perceptions of corruption among civil servants (which could 
be expected as a preference for status quo could go together with the perception of low-corruption).  
 
Figure 3: Predicted probability for “should-be” for non-EU-migrants’ access to healthcare by “are” 
perceptions. Controlled socio-economic differences, feeling of shared identity and perception of 
economic gain/loss on EU/non-EU-migrants. Left figure non-populist right wing-voters. Right 
figure populist right-wing voters 
 
The only consistent interaction effect is that the status quo effect is more moderate among populist 
right-wing voters. These are operationalized as those voting for the Danish People Party (n=58), the 
Dutch Party for Freedom (n=53) and the German AFD (n=3). The models show that this particular 
segment, as expected, is a little more inclined than non-populist right-wing voters to opt for a 
stricter entitlement criterion and not for the (perceived) current rule. As an example, the predicted 
probability of preferring different entitlement criteria for non-EU-migrants’ access to healthcare are 
shown in Figure 3; respectively for the non-populist (left) and populist right-wing voters (right).iv 
As expected, the predicted probability of answering “residence” or “residence plus time” is higher 
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among non-populist right-wing voters while the predicted probability of answering “never” or 
“citizenship” is higher among populist right-wing voters (see Figure 3). However, it is also clear 
that one still finds the status quo effect among populist right-wing voters. Populist right-wing voters 
believing that non-EU-migrants have immediate access to healthcare have 39 percent probability of 
answering that this is how “should be”, while the predicted probability of answering “never” is 20 
percent; still controlled for other relevant variables (see Figure 3).  
  
Figure 4: Predicted probability for “should-be” for non-EU-migrants’ access to social assistance by 
“are” perceptions. Controlled socio-economic differences, feeling of shared identity and perception 
of economic gain/loss on EU/non-EU-migrants. Left figure the Netherlands/Germany. Right figure 
Denmark  
  
 
Finally, the models show that Thesis II also holds true in the critical case of Danes’ attitudes to 
migrants’ entitlement to social assistance. Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of choosing 
entitlement criteria for non-EU-migrants, respectively for Dutch/Germans (left-panel) and Danes 
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(right-panel). The left-panel shows the general result that perceptions of existing social assistance 
rules strongly correlates with preferences; a German/Dutch e.g. believing that access is given with 
the combination of residence and time has a 41 percent probability of giving the same should-be-
answer. As expected, the status quo effect is less prominent for Danish attitudes to social assistance. 
Danes believing that access is given by the combination of residence and time (the right answer) 
only has a 17 percent probability of having this “should-be” preference. The same person has a 50 
percent probability of choosing the work and contribution criterion, everything else equal. 
However, even in this most critical case, it holds true that having a given “are-perception” increases 
the likelihood of choosing this specific criterion. The 17 percent probability should be compared 
with the probability of choosing this criterion (the grey-squares) holding one of the other “are-
perceptions”. Thus, even though holding a given “are-perception” does not go together with the 
highest probability of choosing this criterion, as it is the case in the Netherlands and Germany, it 
holds true that a given are-perception makes the should-be perception more likely; even in the cases 
of Danes’ attitudes to migrants’ access to social assistance.    
 
Conclusion  
The article finds support for the institutional argument that the entitlement criteria of existing 
welfare schemes shape perceptions of what is (Thesis I), which again shape preferences for what 
ought to be (Thesis II). In the case of migrants’ entitlements, there is not a one to one match 
between reality and perceptions. The public was bewildered by migrants’ entitlement to social 
assistance, the Danish Peoples’ pension and Dutch childcare, while entitlement criteria of 
healthcare, unemployment protection, Dutch and German public pension and Danish and German 
childcare were better recognized. Thus, Thesis I was only partly confirmed. The relationship 
between the perceived entitlement criteria and preferences was clear-cut. Thesis II holds true across 
the three countries, across EU- and non-EU-migrants and across all five areas. Thesis II even holds 
true within the segment of populist right-wing voters (though more moderate) and in the critical 
case of Danes’ attitudes to migrants’ entitlement to social assistance (though more moderate). This 
is taken as an indication of clear institutional effects though aggregate studies of regime-effects 
have been inclusive.   
The study comes with limitations. Firstly, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits 
the possibility to make causal inferences. Public preferences could influence migrants’ entitlement 
criteria (reverse causality). The article assumed this was not the case. Secondly, the article has only 
shown that the status quo effect is present in three well-functioning welfare states with thriving 
economies, a well-informed electorate and an absence of ethnic nationalism (Larsen, 2017). The 
status quo effect could be weaker in other contexts; despite the argument of Denmark being a 
critical case due to political mobilization on this issue. Thirdly, it is a limitation that e.g. the pension 
area consists of differences schemes. Had the public been asked even more specifically, there might 
have been a better match between actual and perceived entitlement criteria.  
The overall conclusion is that the strongest bulwark against welfare nationalist 
attitudes is the presence of historically given welfare schemes that actually give migrants 
entitlement. This does clearly not mean that migrants’ entitlements cannot be questioned and 
restricted. However, it does support the proposition that, under the condition of ethnic diversity, 
building support for new welfare schemes and maintaining support for old welfare schemes is two 
very different things. In the latter, Northern European context, existing institutions set standards for 
what is normal, possible and just.  
  
Endnotes 
   
i No answer on how entitlement rules “are” is included as dummy. 
ii The response categories were, “not at all”, “weak”, “moderate”, “close” and “very close”. No answer was 
coded as “moderate”. 
iii The response categories were “contribute more in taxes than they benefit from social benefits and 
services”, “benefit more from social benefits and services than they contribute in taxes”, “it’s equal” and 
“do not know”. Included as a scale from 1) contribute more 2) equal/don’t know / no answer to 3) benefit 
more. 
iv These models are run without country dummies due to the very few populist right-wing voters in the 
German sample. The models cannot be estimated with country dummies included.   
                                                            
References 
Alesina A and Glaeser E (2004) Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe. A World of Difference. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Andersen JG (2007) Restricting access to social protection for immigrants in the Danish welfare 
state. Benefits 15(3): 257-269. 
Andersen JG and Bjørklund T (1990) Structural changes and new cleavages: The Progress Parties in 
Denmark and Norway. Acta Sociologica 33(3): 195-217. 
Bay A, Finseraas H and Pedersen AW (2013) Welfare dualism in two Scandinavian welfare states: 
Public opinion and party politics. West European Politics 36(1): 199-220. 
Bekhuis H, Hedegaard TF, Seibel V and Degen D (2018) MIFARE Survey: Migrants’ Welfare State 
Attitudes Methodological Report. : Univeristy of Nijmegen. 
Blauberger M, Heindlmaier A, Kramer D, Martinsen DS, Schenk A, Thierry JS, et al. (2018) ECJ 
judges read the morning papers. Explaining the turnaround of European citizenship jurisprudence. 
25(10). 
Breidahl KN (2017) Den danske velfærdsstat og de nye medborgere: Bakker ikke-vestlige 
indvandrere og efterkommere op om velfærdsstatens centrale værdier. Politica 49(3): 273-291. 
Careja R, Elmelund‐Præstekær C, Baggesen Klitgaard M and Larsen EG (2016) Direct and Indirect 
Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party. Scandinavian 
Political Studies 39(4): 435-457. 
Crepaz MML and Damron R (2009) How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants. 
Comparative Political Studies 43(3): pp. 437-467. 
De Koster W, Achterberg P and Van der Waal J (2013) The new right and the welfare state: The 
electoral relevance of welfare chauvinism and welfare populism in the Netherlands. International 
Political Science Review 34(1): 3-20. 
Eger MA, Larsen CA and Mewes J (forthcoming) Welfare nationalism before and after the 
“migration crisis”. In: Meuleman B, Oorschot Wv and Laenen T (eds) Welfare State Legitimacy in 
Times of Crisis and Austerity: Between Continuity and Change’Welfare State Legitimacy in Times 
of Crisis and Austerity: Between Continuity and Change. : Edward Elgar. 
Eger MA and Valdez S (2018) From radical right to neo-nationalist. European Political Science: 1-
21. 
Eger MA and Valdez S (2014) Neo-nationalism in Western Europe. European Sociological Review: 
jcu087. 
Emmenegger P (2012) The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in 
Deindustrializing Societies. : OUP USA. 
Esping-Andersen G (1999) Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Esping-Andersen G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Ford R (2016) Who should we help? An experimental test of discrimination in the British welfare 
state. Political Studies 64(3): 630-650. 
Freeman GP (1986) Migration and the political economy of the welfare state. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 485(1): 51-63. 
Furnham A (2003) Belief in a just world: Research progress over the past decade. Personality and 
Individual Differences 34(5): 795-817. 
Gerhards J and Lengfeld H (2013) European Integration, equality rights and people’s beliefs: 
Evidence from Germany. European Sociological Review 29(1): 19-31. 
Gordon Marshall, Swift A, Routh D and Burgoyne C (1999) What Is and What Ought to Be: 
Popular Beliefs about Distributive Justice in Thirteen Countries. European Sociological Review 
15(4): pp. 349-367. 
Hall PA and Taylor RC (1996) Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political 
Studies 44(5): 936-957. 
Heizmann B, Jedinger A and Perry A (2018) Welfare Chauvinism, Economic Insecurity and the 
Asylum Seeker “Crisis”. Societies 8(3): 83. 
Hjorth F (2015) Who benefits? Welfare chauvinism and national stereotypes. European Union 
Politics 17(1): 3-24. 
Homans GC (1974) Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Kahneman D, Knetsch JL and Thaler R (1986) Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: 
Entitlements in the market. The American Economic Review: 728-741. 
Kjærsgård AP (2012) Scandinavian attitudes to pay - egalitarianism and aversion towards top 
excess. CCWS Working Paper 2012(77). 
Kootstra A (2016) Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands: 
Examining the Role of Ethnicity and Migration Status Using a Vignette Experiment. European 
Sociological Review: jcw010. 
Larsen CA (2017) Revitalizing the ‘civic’and ‘ethnic’distinction. Perceptions of nationhood across 
two dimensions, 44 countries and two decades. Nations and Nationalism 23(4): 970-993. 
Larsen CA (2008) The institutional logic of welfare attitudes. Comparative Political Studies 41(2): 
pp. 145-168. 
Lerner MJ (1980) The Belief in a just World: A Fundamental Delusion. New York: Plenum Press. 
March JG and Olsen JP (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. 
New York: Free Press. 
Marx P and Naumann E (2018) Do right-wing parties foster welfare chauvinistic attitudes? A 
longitudinal study of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ in Germany. Electoral Studies 52: 111-116. 
Mewes J and Mau S (2013) Globalization, socio-economic status and welfare chauvinism: 
European perspectives on attitudes toward the exclusion of immigrants. International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology 54(kapitel 3): 228-245. 
Mewes J and Mau S (2012) Unraveling working-class welfare chauvinism. In: Svallfors S (ed) 
Contested Welfare States. Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond. : Stanford University Press 
Stanford, 119-157. 
Miller D (1993) In defence of nationality. Journal of Applied Philosophy 10(1): 3-16. 
Pennings F (2012) EU citizenship: access to social benefits in other EU member states. Int'L 
J.Comp.Lab.L.& Indus.Rel. 28: 307. 
Pennings F and Seeleib-Kaiser M (2018) EU Citizenship and Social Rights : Entitlements and 
Impediments to Accessing Welfare. Cheltenahm: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Reeskens T and van der Meer T (2018) The inevitable deservingness gap: A study into the 
insurmountable immigrant penalty in perceived welfare deservingness. Journal of European Social 
Policy. 
Reeskens T and van Oorschot W (2012) Disentangling the ‘New Liberal Dilemma’: On the relation 
between general welfare redistribution preferences and welfare chauvinism. International Journal 
of Comparative Sociology: 0020715212451987. 
Rothstein B (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ruhs M and Palme J (2018) Institutional contexts of political conflicts around free movement in the 
European Union: a theoretical analysis. Journal of European Public Policy 25(10): 1391-1402. 
Schaeffer M (2013) Ethnic Diversity, Public Goods Provision and Social Cohesion: Lessons from 
an Inconclusive Literature. : WZB Discussion Paper. 
Schumacher G and van Kersbergen K (2014) Do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare 
chauvinism of populist parties? Party Politics: 1354068814549345. 
Svallfors S (2012) Contested Welfare States: Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond. : Stanford 
University Press. 
Svallfors S (2007) The Political Sociology of the Welfare State: Institutions, Social Cleavages, and 
Orientations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Titmuss RM (1974) Social Policy: An Introduction. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Van Der Waal J, De Koster W and Van Oorschot W (2013) Three worlds of welfare chauvinism? 
How welfare regimes affect support for distributing welfare to immigrants in Europe. Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 15(2): 164-181. 
  
 
